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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
 
The overall purpose of this project is to make detailed population and poverty projections 
that take into account expected demographic changes (in terms of fertility, mortality, 
migration, and education) as well as differentials in social mobility by household type.  
 
Such projections could be useful for a variety of purposes ranging from assessment of 
necessary social investments (education facilities, health facilities, pension systems, etc), 
projections of the size of the working age population who will demand jobs, targeting of 
poverty alleviation policies, projections of migration flows, to negotiations with external 
donors and creditors.  
 
The purpose of this report is to present the methodology used to make the model and to 
present a series of simulation results. Chapter 2 presents the methodology applied as well 
as all the assumptions used for the central scenario population and poverty projections. 
Chapter 3 presents the predictions arising from the central scenario in terms of poverty, 
working age population, etc over the period 1995-2015. Chapter 4 investigates the impact 
of different socio-economic and demographic factors by comparing the central scenario 
with alternative scenarios with other assumptions about migration, fertility, education, 
GDP growth, inequality, etc. Chapter 5 makes a sensitivity analysis on main assumptions 
using bootstrapping methods. It also assesses the relative importance of different socio-
economic and demographic factors in affecting poverty. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes. 
Appendix A provides a poverty and social mobility analysis of all the factors considered 
to define relevant population sub-groups, but several of these were found be of little 
relevance (such as sex, sex of the head of household, number of adults in the household, 
and age) in terms of poverty and social mobility. Appendix B includes some technical 
details.   
 
The results show that at the individual level, the level of education in the household is by 
far the most important characteristic determining the level of poverty, the degree of 
vulnerability, and the degree of upward social mobility. Number of children below 15 in 
the household is also an important determinant of poverty, with many children (4 or 
more) causing higher poverty, higher vulnerability, and less upward mobility. Location is 
also important with people in rural areas generally being more poor and more vulnerable. 
There are exceptions to this rule, however. Individuals living in rural households with 
high levels of education (at least one person with 4 years of secondary) and few children 
(3 or less) are very unlikely to become worse off over time and very likely to improve 
their situation (low vulnerability and high upward social mobility).  
 
Gender was found to have no influence on neither poverty nor social mobility. Poverty 
and vulnerability were found to decrease with age, and upward mobility to increase with 
age. This makes sense since people build up assets (both human, physical, and social) 
over their lives, and this should make them less poor and less vulnerable. This result may 
be somewhat exaggerated, however, because of the lack of use of equivalence scales in 
the calculation of poverty lines. In essence, the 4
th child in a household is assumed to   6
need the same amount of resources as the first adult, which is clearly not the case. This 
means that the degree of poverty is generally exaggerated in households with many 
members (usually many children). 
 
At the national level, the most important variables determining poverty and social 
mobility are changes in the income distribution and economic growth. Thus, growth is 
essential for the reduction of poverty in Nicaragua, and the more pro-poor, the better. An 
important supporting measure, that help reduce poverty is to help families avoid having 
too many children. Education improvements is also a very important policy initiative, 
which is particularly pro-poor.  
 
Rural-urban migration is found to help reduce aggregate poverty, but it contributes to 
increasing urban poverty. This means that special attention is needed to secure that the 
new migrants arriving to urban areas get adequately and quickly integrated into the urban 
society with all basic services and as well as job possibilities.  
 
Job creation is going to be a big challenge over the coming decades, as the working age 
population in Nicaragua will grow dramatically from 2.2 million people in 1995 to about 
4.1 million in 2015. This means that around 95,000 new jobs are needed every year in 
order to keep the population occupied, and 74,000 of these will be needed in urban areas. 
 
The number of children under 15, is expected to reach a maximum of 2.1 million in 2005 
and then start falling slowly to just under 2 million in 2015. This does not imply that the 
need for schools will fall, however, since there is ample room to increase the enrollment 
rates.  
 
The size of the population of people over 65 is still very small in Nicaragua, but it is 
expected to more than double from 152 thousand in 1995 to 313 thousand in 2015. 
 
The rapid growth of the working age population together with the fall in number of 
children and the moderate increase in people over 65, implies that the dependency burden 
in Nicaragua is destined to fall dramatically. This is a one-time advantage caused by the 
demographic transition that the country is undergoing, and it is going to help reduce 
poverty during the coming couple of decades. 
 
However, even under the most favorable conditions, there is no way poverty could be 
reduced by half by 2015. Actually, anything more than a 10 percent reduction seem 
unrealistic given the present structure of the population and the economy. Extreme 
poverty could be reduced by up to 30 percent under the most favorable conditions, but a 
15 percent reduction seem more realistic. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1. The multi-state cohort-component model 
 
Population projections are made using a multi-state cohort-component model with 5-year 
age groups.  
 
The cohort-component model is somewhat extended compared to the traditional 
demographic accounting system, since we take into account “migration” not only in 
geographic terms, but also in terms of poverty, and other relevant socio-demographic 
factors. Thus, for each sub-group we have the following equation: 
 
               P1 = P0 + B - D + DNM + INM + POV + SOCIO  
 
where: 
       P1  = population at the end of the period 
       P0  = population at the beginning of the period 
       B   = births during the period 
       D   = deaths during the period 
       DNM = domestic net migration during the period 
  INM = international net migration during the period 
  POV = net “migration” to other poverty groups 
  SOCIO = net “migration” to other socio-demographic group 
 
This model is able to treat demographic and socioeconomic changes simultanousely 
while jointly predicting changes in population composition and poverty. 
 
 
2.2. Choice of relevant “states” 
 
The first step is to identify which “states” are relevant, i.e. which individual or household 
characteristics affect fertility, mortality, migration, poverty and social mobility in a 
significant way. Appendix A presents poverty and social mobility information for many 
possible characteristics, such as education level, gender, area of residence, number of 
children in the household, gender of the head of household, age, and region. Three 
characteristics were found to be very important determinants of poverty and social 
mobility: Education level in the household, number of children in the household, and 
rural/urban location. Table 2.1 shows the distribution of individuals between poverty 
groups for individuals from different types of households defined by location (rural, 
urban), highest education level in household (less than four years of secondary, four or 
more years of secondary), and number of children below 15 years of age (three or less, 
four or more). 
   8
Table 2.1: Poverty distributions for individuals from different household types, 1998 and 
2001 (%)  
1998 2001   
 













Urban, low edu, few kids (18.3%)  5.7 23.2  71.1 5.0  26.5  68.5
Urban, low edu, many kids (10.6%) 22.0 48.0  30.0 22.4  45.2  32.4
Urban, high edu, few kids (24.9%)  1.1 8.3  90.6 0.3  10.4  89.3
Urban, high edu, many kids (4.2%)  9.0 25.0  66.0 5.7  38.1  56.2
Rural, low edu, few kids (19.9%)  18.5 42.4  39.1 20.5  42.9  36.6
Rural, low edu, many kids (16.2%)  48.1 39.5  12.4 43.9  42.2  13.9
Rural, high edu, few kids (4.0%)  1.1 25.8  73.1 1.8  20.2  78.0
Rural, high edu, many kids (1.8%)  15.9 41.5  42.6 8.5  41.7  49.8
Total  (100%)  17.2 30.4 52.4 15.1 30.8 54.2
Note: Author’s estimations based on 22793 individuals in EMNV 1998 and 22810 individuals in EMNV 
2001 using the expansion factor PESO2.  
 
It is clear that urban households are generally less poor than rural households, but there 
are very important differences within each area. Individuals from households where at 
least one person has achieved 4 years of highschool are substantially less poor than 
individuals from households where the highest education level attained is three years of 
highschool or less. For example, in 2001 only 1.8 percent of rural individuals from 
families with few kids and high education were extremely poor, while this was the case 
for 20.5 percent of rural individuals from families with few kids and low education 
levels. 
 
Within each location-education combination it is clear that the individuals from 
households with few children are substantially less poor than individuals from households 
with many children. For example, the probability of being extremely poor is 5.0 percent 
for urban individuals with low education and few kids in the household, while it is 22.4 
percent for similar individuals from households where there are 4 or more children.  
 
There has been some overall reduction in poverty between 1998 and 2001, but it was very 
unevenly distributed. Many sub-groups even experienced increases in poverty, and most 
dramatically so the group of urban individuals from households with high education 
levels and many kids (the percentage of non-poor dropped from 66.0% to 56.2%). 
Individuals from rural households with high education levels experienced the largest 
reductions in poverty, but these comprise less than 6 percent of the total population. In 
general the overall decrease in poverty of 2.2 percent was due more to “migration” to 
more favorable groups, than to improvements within groups. 
 
2.3. Social Mobility 
 
Very little is known about what influences social mobility, since adequate data has not 
been available until the release of the Encuesta de Medicion de Niveles de Vida (EMNV) 
2001, which tracks most of the individuals that were interviewed in the EMNV 1998. 
Using those two data sets it is possible to estimate the degree of social mobility for   9
different types of individuals.  
 
Social mobility can be represented by Markov Transition Matrices, an example of which 
is shown in Table 2.2. This matrix shows that the probability that an extremely poor 
individual in Nicaragua in 1998 remain extremely poor in 2001 is 51.2%. The probability 
that he will be only moderately poor in 2001 is 39.7%, and the probability of escaping 
poverty altogether is 9.1%. Similarly, the probability that a non-poor individual in 1998 
will end up in poverty in 2001 is 1.8% + 16.7% = 18.5%. 
 
Table 2.2: Markov Transition Matrix for individuals in Nicaragua, 1998-2001  
  Poverty classification in 2001 
Poverty classifica-






Extreme Poverty  0.512 0.397 0.091 1.000 
Moderate Poverty  0.173 0.500 0.327 1.000 
Non-Poor  0.018 0.167 0.815 1.000 
Note: Author’s estimations based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from EMNV 1998  
and 2001 using the expansion factor PESO2. Has undergone a bi-proportional adjustment procedure to 
make the marginal poverty distributions coincide with the actual distributions for the whole population. 
 
 
These transition probabilities vary greatly between household types, however. Individuals 
from rural households are generally more vulnerable (downward mobility) than 
individuals from urban households and individuals from households with many children 
are generally more vulnerable than individuals from households with fewer children. The 
level of education in the household is also found to be a very important determinant of 
social mobility, whereas the sex and age of the head of household are irrelevant as is the 
number of adults in the household. Since location, education, and number of children are 
highly correlated it is difficult to say which factors are really important in determining 
social mobility and which factors are associated with social mobility just because they are 
associated with those main factors.  
 
In order to find the truly important characteristics, transition matrices were estimated for 
all the different combinations of the three most important household characteristics: 
Residence (“rural” or “urban”), number of children in the household (“3 or less” or “4 or 
more”), and the highest education level in the household
1 (“three years of secondary or  
less” or “four years of secondary or more”). The results are given in Table 2.3. 
 
                                                 
1 We cannot use the education level of the individual because of the large number of children and young 
people who are still in school. The highest level of education those kids will eventually get is better 
approximated by the highest level of education found in the household than by their current level of 
education.   10
Table 2.3: Adjusted Markov Transition Matrices for individuals from different household 
types, 1998-2001  












Extreme Poverty  0.359 0.466 0.175  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.094 0.516 0.390  1.000
Urban 
Little education 
Few children  Non-Poor  0.011 0.167 0.822  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.571 0.332 0.097  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.192 0.549 0.259  1.000
Urban 
Little education 
Many children  Non-Poor  0.021 0.384 0.596  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.021 0.187 0.792  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.008 0.513 0.480  1.000
Urban 
More education 
Few children  Non-Poor  0.002 0.065 0.932  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.189 0.757 0.054  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.133 0.594 0.273  1.000
Urban 
More education 
Many children  Non-Poor  0.010 0.249 0.741  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.529 0.399 0.072  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.205 0.532 0.263  1.000
Rural 
Little education 
Few children  Non-Poor  0.052 0.332 0.616  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.628 0.332 0.039  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.307 0.503 0.190  1.000
Rural 
Little education 
Many children  Non-Poor  0.124 0.510 0.366  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.001 0.287 0.712  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.070 0.466 0.464  1.000
Rural 
More education 
Few children  Non-Poor  0.000 0.107 0.893  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.008 0.869 0.123  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.202 0.524 0.274  1.000
Rural 
More education 
Many children  Non-Poor  0.000 0.144 0.856  1.000
Nota: Author’s estimations based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from  EMNV 1998 and 2001 
using the expansion factor PESO2. Have undergone bi-proportional adjustment procedures to make the 
sample marginal poverty distributions coincide with the actual marginal distributions for the respective sub-
populations. 
 
To facilitate easier comparison of transition matrixes we create an index of downward 
mobility (vulnerability) and an index of upward mobility. The first is calculated as the 
sum of the three probabilities of moving to a lower economic level and the second as the 
sum of the three probabilities of moving up one or two categories between 1998 and 
2001. These two indices are shown in Table 2.4 for the eight different household types. 
 
The most common household type is “urban, more education, few children” which is also 
the most desirable category. Individuals from this category have the lowest degree of 
vulnerability and the highest degree of upward mobility. 
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Table 2.4: Indices of Vulnerability and Upward Mobility, by household type, 1998-2001  











Urban, little education, few children  18.3 0.272 1.030 
Urban, little education, many children  10.6 0.596 0.688 
Urban, more education, few children  24.9 0.075 1.459 
Urban, more education, many children  4.2 0.393 1.084 
Rural, little education, few children  19.9 0.588 0.735 
Rural, little education, many children  16.2 0.941 0.562 
Rural, more education, few children  4.0 0.177 1.462 
Rural, more education, many children  1.8 0.345 1.266 
Note: Author’s estimation based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from EMNV 1998 and 2001 
using the expansion factor PESO2.  
 
 
The most vulnerable individuals are the ones from the following household types: 
 
-  Rural, low level of education, many children (0.941) 
-  Urban, low level of education, many children (0.596) 
-  Rural, low level of education, few children (0.588) 
  
The most upwardly mobile individuals are the ones from the following types of 
households: 
 
-  Rural, high level of education, few children (1.462) 
-  Urban, high level of education, few children (1.459) 
-  Rural, high level of education, many children (1.266) 
 
And the individuals with the lowest probabilities of improving their situation are the ones 
from the following types of households: 
 
-  Rural, low level of education, many children (0.562) 
-  Rural, low level of education, few children (0.735) 
-  Urban, low level of education, many children (0.688) 
 
It is clear from this simple analysis that by far the most important determinant of social 
mobility is education, while area of residence and number of children in household is of 
secondary importance.  
 
Within each location-education combination, the individuals living in households with 
many children are always more vulnerable and less upwardly mobile than individuals 
from households with few children.  
 
   12
2.4. Social Mobility and Socio-demographic factors 
 
In order to make these mobility matrices more flexible for later use, we will parameterize 
them in the following way. A matrix consists of nine transition probabilities which we 
will call A1, A2,.., C3, like this: 
 
  Poverty classification in 2001 
Poverty classifica-






Extreme Poverty  A1 A2 A3 1.000 
Moderate Poverty  B1 B2 B3 1.000 
Non-Poor  C1 C2 C3 1.000 
 
All probabilities can only take on values between 0 and 1. In addition, we have the 
following three constraints on the values: 
 
A1+A2+A3 = 1 
B1+B2+B3 = 1 
C1+C2+C3 = 1. 
 
In order to make one parameterized matrix out of the 8 matrices in Table 3, we estimate 
the parameters of the following set of equations:  
 
A1 = α1 + α2 ⋅AREA + α3 ⋅KIDS + α4 ⋅EDU   
A2 = α5 + α6 ⋅AREA + α7 ⋅KIDS + α8 ⋅EDU  
A3 = 1 – (A1+A2)  
B1 = β1 + β2 ⋅AREA + β3 ⋅KIDS + β4 ⋅EDU   
B2 = β5 + β6 ⋅AREA + β7 ⋅KIDS + β8 ⋅EDU   
B3 = 1 – (B1+B2) 
C1 = γ1 + γ2 ⋅AREA + γ3 ⋅KIDS + γ4 ⋅EDU   
C2 = γ5 + γ6 ⋅AREA + γ7 ⋅KIDS + γ8 ⋅EDU   
C3 = 1 – (C1+C2), 
 
where AREA is a variable that can take on the value 0 (rural) or 1 (urban), KIDS is a 
variable that can take on the value 0 (3 children or less in household) or 1 (4 children or 
more in household), and EDU can take on the value 0 (less than four years of secondary 
in household) or 1 (four years of secondary education or more in household). 
 
When estimating this system by minimizing the total sum of squared differences between 
predicted values and the observed values in Table 3 we get the following results: 
 
A1 = 0.464 -0.007⋅AREA + 0.122⋅KIDS - 0.467⋅EDU  
         (7.0)   (-0.1)                 (1.8)              (-7.1) 
 
  
A2 = 0.282 - 0.036⋅AREA + 0.238⋅KIDS + 0.143⋅EDU    13
        (1.6)     (-0.2)                   (1.4)                 (0.8) 
 
A3 = 1 – (A1+A2)  
 
 
B1 = 0.216 - 0.133⋅AREA + 0.013⋅KIDS - 0.022⋅EDU   
          (3.2)    (-2.0)                (0.2)              (-0.3) 
 
B2 = 0.489 + 0.037⋅AREA + 0.036⋅KIDS - 0.001⋅EDU   
          (21.0)    (1.6)                (1.5)                (-0.0) 
 
B3 = 1 – (B1+B2) 
 
 
C1 = 0.057 - 0.033⋅AREA + 0.023⋅KIDS - 0.049⋅EDU   
         (2.4)     (-1.4)                 (0.9)              (-2.0) 
 
C2 = 0.300 - 0.057⋅AREA + 0.154⋅KIDS - 0.207⋅EDU   
         (5.3)     (-1.0)                 (2.7)              (-3.7) 
 
C3 = 1 – (C1+C2), 
 
where the numbers in parantheses are t-values. Many of the coefficients could not be 
accurately estimated (t-values less than 2) and it is better to stay with the original 8 
matrices in Table 3. Since the table includes all possible combinations (rural, urban, high 
education, low education, few kids, many kids) little is gained by this parameterization. 
 
However, the parameterization allows us to see how our Downward and Upward 
Mobility Indices (DMI and UMI) depend on location, education level, and number of 
children in household. 
 
  DMI = B1 + C1 + C2  
                    = 0.216 - 0.133⋅AREA + 0.013⋅KIDS - 0.022⋅EDU 
                    + 0.057 - 0.033⋅AREA + 0.023⋅KIDS - 0.049⋅EDU   
                    + 0.300 - 0.057⋅AREA + 0.154⋅KIDS - 0.207⋅EDU     
                    = 0.573 - 0.223⋅AREA + 0.190⋅KIDS - 0.278⋅EDU  
 
It is seen that downward mobility (vulnerability) is smaller in urban areas, bigger in 
households with 4 or more children under 15 and smaller if there is at least one person in 
the household that has completed four years of secondary education. The effect of 
education is the strongest of thee three.  
 
  UMI = A2 + A3 + B3 = A2 + 1 - A1 - A2 + 1 - B1 - B2 = 2 - A1 - B1 - B2 
          =  2 - (0.464 -0.007⋅AREA + 0.122⋅KIDS - 0.467⋅EDU) 
                           - (0.216 - 0.133⋅AREA + 0.013⋅KIDS - 0.022⋅EDU) 
                   - (0.489 + 0.037⋅AREA + 0.036⋅KIDS - 0.001⋅EDU)   14
          = 0.831 +  0.103⋅AREA - 0.171⋅KIDS + 0.490⋅EDU. 
 
Similarly, living in urban areas adds to upward mobility as does living in a household 
where at least one person has completed four years of highschool. Living in a household 
with 4 children or more reduces upward mobility. The high coefficient on EDU indicates 
that the education level is substantially more important for upward mobility than than 
location and number of children in the household. 
  
 
2.5. Links between social mobility, economic growth and inequality: 
 
Between 1998 and 2001, Nicaragua experienced an average annual growth rate in per 
capita GDP of 2.4% per year and a simultaneous reduction in the GINI coefficient of 
approximately 1 percentage point per year
2. The resulting changes in poverty was an 
overall decrease in poverty of 0.67 percentage points per year and an overall decrease in 
extreme poverty of 0.73 percentage points per year. The corresponding poverty transition 
probabilities for the whole population and the eight main sub-groups are found in Table 2 
and 3 above.  
 
These matrices were generated over a three-year period, but we need to apply them on 5-
year periods in our poverty-population simulations later. In order to do that we assume 
that a 2.4% annual growth rate over 3 years corresponds to a 1.5% growth rate over 5 
years in terms of poverty reduction. Similarly, we assume that a 1 percentage point 
annual decrease in Gini per year over 3 years corresponds to 0.5 percentage point annual 
decrease over 5 years. 
 
This gives us a base 5-year transition matrix corresponding to average annual growth of 
per capita GDP of 1.5% and an average annual reduction in the Gini coefficient of half a 
percentage point per year. 
  
Little is known about how the social transition matrix would change under alternative 
assumptions about growth and inequality. A recent investigation into the relationships 
between growth, income distribution, and poverty in Latin America suggests that poverty 
is much more responsive to changes in the income distribution than to changes in GDP 
growth (IPEA 2002). Their estimates for Nicaragua suggest that a reduction in the Gini 
coefficient of 1 percentage point would achieve the same reduction in extreme poverty as 
an increase in per capita GDP of 3% - 12%, depending on what poverty line is used 
(IPEA 2002, Figure 15). Their National Poverty Line (114$/month in 1999) can be 
interpreted as the general poverty line and their International Poverty Line (37.2$/month 
in 1999) can be interpreted as the extreme poverty line. Thus, we find that a one 
percentage point decrease in the Gini coefficient would generate the same reduction in 
extreme poverty as a 12% increase in GDP per capita and the same reduction in general 
                                                 
2 The GINI coefficient based on consumption decreased from 0.446 in 1998 to 0.418 in 2001 (calculated 
from EMNV 1998 and 2001) and the GINI coefficient based on income decreased from 0.603 in 1998 to 
0.56 in 2001 (Indice de Desarrollo Humano 2001 and Informe Final del Millenium Development Goals de 
Nicaragua).   15
poverty as a 3% increase in GDP per capita. Thus, the effect of inequality changes is 
about 4 times stronger on extreme poverty than on poverty. Economic growth, on the 
other hand, has approximately the same effect on poverty and extreme poverty. 
 
These results, however, are not consistent with the observed changes between 1998 and 
2001. With approximately a 1 percentage point reduction in Gini per year during the 
period we would have expected to see extreme poverty fall much more than general 
poverty, and in fact the difference was only marginal (2.2 percentage points versus 2.0 
percentage points).  
 
So instead we assume that changes in the Gini coefficient work only twice as strongly on 
extreme poverty as on general poverty. If, in addition, we assume that zero growth in per 
capita GDP combined with zero changes in the income distribution would lead to no 
reductions in poverty and no reductions in extreme poverty, we can generate a set of 
plausible relationships between growth, inequality, and poverty reduction as indicated in 
Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5: Possible relationships between GDP growth, income distribution and poverty 
reduction. 
Per capita GDP 
growth rate 
(% per year) 
Change in GINI 
coefficient 
(%-points per year) 
Reduction in poverty
(%-points per year) 
Reduction in 
extreme poverty 
(%-points per year) 
0 0 0  0.0 
0 -0.5  0.2 0.4 
0 -1.0  0.4 0.8 
1.5 0 0.2  0.2 
1.5 -0.5 0.4  0.6 
1.5 -1.0 0.6  1.0 
3 0  0.4  0.4 
3 -0.5  0.6 0.8 
3 -1.0  0.8 1.2 
Note: A compromise between observed macro-values and micro-simulations from IPEA (2002).  
  
These 9 growth-distribution-poverty combinations have been translated into 9 different 
transition matrices using a bi-proportional adjustment procedure to secure that the 
implied poverty reductions inherent in the matrices coincide with the targets in Table 2.5. 
The 9 new transition matrices are shown in Table 2.6.   16
Table 2.6: Adjusted Markov Transition Matrices for individuals from different household 
types, 1998-2001  


















Extreme Poverty  0.564 0.364 0.076 1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.207 0.488 0.306 1.000
0.0 0.0 
Non-Poor  0.023 0.179 0.797 1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.515 0.401  0.085  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.176 0.502  0.322  1.000
0.0  -0.5 
Non-Poor  0.019 0.177  0.804  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.464 0.441 0.095 1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.148 0.515 0.336 1.000
0.0 -1.0 
Non-Poor  0.015 0.175 0.810 1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.540 0.378  0.082  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.191 0.489  0.320  1.000
1.5  0.0 
Non-Poor  0.021 0.174  0.806  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.507 0.403 0.090 1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.171 0.495 0.335 1.000
1.5 -0.5 
Non-Poor  0.018 0.169 0.813 1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.437 0.460  0.104  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.134 0.515  0.351  1.000
1.5  -1.0 
Non-Poor  0.013 0.169  0.818  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.517 0.394 0.090 1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.176 0.489 0.335 1.000
3.0 0.0 
Non-Poor  0.018 0.168 0.814 1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.465 0.434  0.101  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.148 0.502  0.349  1.000
3.0  -0.5 
Non-Poor  0.015 0.166  0.820  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.408 0.478 0.113 1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.120 0.514 0.366 1.000
3.0 -1.0 
Non-Poor  0.012 0.164 0.825 1.000
Source: Author’s estimations.   17
 
By comparing Table 2.3 and Table 2.6 it is seen that the differences due to economic 
factors (GDP growth and changes in the income distribution) are much smaller than the 
differences due to socio-demographic factors (education, residence, and number of 
children). This suggests that socio-demographic factors are extremely important in the 
determination of poverty. 
 
In order to make these mobility matrices more flexible for later use, we will parameterize 
them in the following way. We call the nine transition probabilities X1, X2,.., Z3, like this: 
 
  Poverty classification in 2001 
Poverty classifica-






Extreme Poverty  X1 X2 X3 1.000 
Moderate Poverty  Y1 Y2 Y3 1.000 
Non-Poor  Z1 Z2 Z3 1.000 
 
All probabilities can only take on values between 0 and 1. In addition, we have the 
following three constraints on the values: 
 
X1+X2+X3 = 1 
Y1+Y2+Y3 = 1 
Z1+Z2+Z3 = 1. 
 
In an attempt to make one parameterized matrix out of the 9 matrices in Table 2.6, we 
estimate the parameters of the following set of equations:  
 
X1 = µ1 + µ2 ⋅GDP + µ3 ⋅GINI   
X2 = µ4 + µ5 ⋅GDP + µ6 ⋅GINI   
X3 = 1 – (X1+X2)  
Y1 = π1 + π2 ⋅GDP + π3 ⋅GINI    
Y2 = π4 + π5 ⋅GDP + π6 ⋅GINI     
Y3 = 1 – (Y1+Y2) 
Z1 = ω1 + ω2 ⋅GDP + ω3 ⋅GINI 
Z2 = ω4 + ω5 ⋅GDP + ω6 ⋅GINI   
Z3 = 1 – (Z1+Z2). 
 
Where GDP is a variable indicating the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP and 
GINI is a variable indicating the average annual percentage point change in the Gini 
coefficient. 
 
Estimating this system by minimizing the squared differences between predicted values 
and the observed values in Table 2.6 yields the following results: 
 
X1 = 0.568 - 0.017⋅GDP + 0.104⋅GINI   18
       (116.3)  (-8.5)             (17.4) 
   
X2 = 0.360 + 0.011⋅GDP - 0.081⋅GINI 
        (85.7)    (6.5)            (-15.8)   
 
X3 = 1 – (X1+X2)  
 
Y1 = 0.207 - 0.010⋅GDP + 0.057⋅GINI 
        (92.0)   (-10.5)           (20.8)    
 
Y2 = 0.488 + 0.0000⋅GDP -0.026⋅GINI 
       (276.7)   (0.0)        (-12.0) 
     
Y3 = 1 – (Y1+Y2) 
 
Z1 = 0.023 - 0.0013⋅GDP + 0.0073⋅GINI 
        (56.1)  (-8.4)                (14.8) 
 
Z2 = 0.179 -0.0037 ⋅GDP + 0.0043⋅GINI   
       (270.9)  (-13.6)             (5.4) 
 
Z3 = 1 – (Z1+Z2). 
 
Unlike the parameterization in the previous section, these parameters are very precisely 
estimated, and the parameterization is useful as it will allow the user to choose 
combinations of growth and inequality changes that are not already shown in Table 2.6.  
 
The coefficients in the X-equations are much bigger than the coefficients in the Y-
equation and Z-equation, which indicates that the extremely poor are much more 
sensitive to changes in GDP growth and changes in the income distribution. Thus, if the 
economy is doing well, the extremely poor tend to benefit relatively more than the 
moderately poor and the non-poor. But they also tend to suffer more if the economy is 
doing bad. 
 
Since the Downward Mobility Index (DMI) is calculated as Y1 + Z1 + Z2, we can 
rearrange the equations above and see that vulnerability decreases with increases in per 
capita GDP growth rates and increases with increases in the GINI coefficient in the 
following way: 
 
DMI = Y1 + Z1 + Z2  = 0.509 - 0.0150⋅GDP + 0.0686⋅GINI.   
 
It is clear that a 1 percentage point decrease in the Gini coefficient has a much higher 
impact on vulnerability than a 1% increase in per capita GDP.  
 
Similarly, we can calculate an equation for the Upward Mobility Index (UMI): 
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UMI = X2 + X3 + Y3 = 0.737 + 0.007⋅GDP - 0.135⋅GINI. 
 
Again it is clear that changes in the Gini coefficient have a much larger impact on upward 




2.6. Combining economic and socio-demographic factors in a set of 
transition matrices: 
 
In order to combine socio-dempgraphic factors and economic factors into the same 
transition matrix we will use the 8 complete socio-demographic transition matrices of 
Table 2.3 as constant terms and use the estimated parameters µ2, µ3, µ5, µ6, π2, π3, π5, π6, 
ω2, ω3, ω5, and ω6 to adjust for changes in GDP and GINI. GDP growth and changes in 
the GINI coefficient have to measured relative to the base values (1.5 percent growth and 
–0.5 percentage point change in GINI per year). 
 
For example, the transition probabilities for urban individuals living in households with 
few kids and a high level of education in a period with average per capita GDP growth 
rates of 4.5% per year (3.0% more than the base) and an annual reduction in the Gini 
coefficient of 1.5 percentage point (1 percentage point better than the base case) would be 
the following: 
 
  Poverty classification in 2001 
Poverty classifica-






Extreme Poverty  0.021 - 0.017⋅3 
- 0.104⋅1 
= 0.000
0.187 + 0.011⋅3 
+ 0.081⋅1
= 0.301




Moderate Poverty  0.008 - 0.010⋅3 
- 0.057⋅1 
= 0.000 
0.513 + 0.000⋅3 
+ 0.026⋅1
= 0.539




Non-Poor  0.002 - 0.0013⋅3 
- 0.0073⋅1 
= 0.000
0.065 - 0.0037⋅3 
- 0.0043⋅1
= 0.050





whereas persons from rural households with many kids and little education under the 
same economic conditions would have the following transition matrix: 
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  Poverty classification in 2001 
Poverty classifica-






Extreme Poverty  0.628 - 0.017⋅3 
- 0.104⋅1 
= 0.473
0.332 + 0.011⋅3 
+ 0.081⋅1
= 0.446




Moderate Poverty  0.307 - 0.010⋅3 
- 0.057⋅1 
= 0.220 
0.503 + 0.000⋅3 
+ 0.026⋅1
= 0.529




Non-Poor  0.124 - 0.0013⋅3 
- 0.0073⋅1 
= 0.113
0.510 - 0.0037⋅3 
- 0.0043⋅1
= 0.495





In the case of less favorable economic conditions (GDP growth of 1.5% and an increase 
in the Gini coefficient of 0.5 percentage point per year) the transition matrix for the latter 
persons would be: 
 
  Poverty classification in 2001 
Poverty classifica-






Extreme Poverty  0.628 - 0.017⋅0 
+ 0.104⋅1 
= 0.732
0.332 + 0.011⋅0 
- 0.081⋅1
= 0.251




Moderate Poverty  0.307 - 0.010⋅0 
+ 0.057⋅1 
= 0.364 
0.503 + 0.000⋅0 
- 0.026⋅1
= 0.477




Non-Poor  0.124 - 0.0013⋅0 
+ 0.0073⋅1 
= 0.131
0.510 - 0.0037⋅0 
+ 0.0043⋅1
= 0.514





In some extreme cases some of these transition probabilities may turn slightly negative 
using these equations. In those cases they are set at zero, since transition probabilities can 
never be negative.  
 
 
2.7. Fertility and family formation assumptions for the central scenario 
 
For our simulation model, we need age-specific fertility rates for the main categories of 
women in our model. 
 
Table 2.7 shows that the age specific fertility rates vary dramatically by education level 
and area of residence. The education level is particularly important for teenage fertility 
with rates substantially lower for women with secondary education. Location is 
particularly important for the fertily rates for women of 35 or older. Rural women with   21
little education keep having high fertility rates after their 35
th year, while for the three 
other groups the rate falls dramatically.  
 











high edu.  Total
15-19 179  70 178 89  119
20-24 194  130 241 163  178
25-29 125  117 190 165  145
30-34 91  88 150 93  108
35-39 44  36 115 46  64
40-44 19  7 51 5  26
45-49 3  0 13 0  6
Note: Births per 1000 women per year in the 36 months preceding the survey.  
Source: Special tabulations made by Oscar Estrada at INEC based on ENDESA 2001 using the 3 years 
previous to the survey. 
 
These fertility rates were estimated for the 1998-2001 period, but for the simulation 
program we need rates for the 1995-2000 period. If we increase all numbers in Table 2.7 
by 10% we get fertility rates that are slightly lower than the official estimates based 
solely on 1995 census information, but compatible with the ENDESA 2001 given the 
rapidly declining fertility trend indicated by this survey.  
 
Table 2.8 shows the recent trends in age-specific fertility rates as calculated from the 
ENDESA 2001. These numbers indicate that fertility reductions have been larger for 
older age-groups than for younger age groups.  
 
Table 2.8: Trends in age-specific fertility rates, ENDESA 2001 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  Number of years preceding the survey   Average rate of 
Mother’s age––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––  reduction (% per 
at birth  0-4  5-9  10-14  15-19    5-year period) 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
    15-19  119 150 163 173      11% 
    20-24  182 242 257 289      14% 
    25-29  149 210 227 280      18% 
  30-34  114  158  175  [ 225      20% 
  35-39  67  95  [ 128  na        28% 
  40-44  28  [  50  na  na      - 
  45-49  [   6  na  na  na      - 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Notes:  Age-specific fertility rates are per 1,000 women.  
  Estimates preceded by a bracket are truncated. 
 na=  not  applicable. 
Source: INEC & MINSA (2001) Table 4.3.1. 
 
For the central scenario we therefore depart from the 4 age-specific fertility tables in 
Table 2.7 (+10%) and reduce the fertility in each age-group by the following percentages 










We do not have evidence to suggest that the pattern of fertility reduction would be 
different between the four main sub-groups, so the same rates of reduction are used for all 
types of women. 
 
We will use the same boy/girl birth-ratio as INEC (n.d.): 1.050. 
 
The number of children under 15 in each household is closely linked to fertility rates, and 
with falling fertility rates we would expect the proportion of people living in households 
with 4 or more children would fall. Fertility rates are not the only determinant of 
household size, however. A decreasing tendency to live in three generation or extended 
households, for example, would accelerate the drop in the proportion of people living in 
households with many children. The same holds for an increase in divorce rates. 
 
Table 2.9 shows that urban households on average have 5.0 members, while rural 
households have 5.7 members. There is quite a lot of variation, however, and we need 
this variation to create sub-groups with many children and few children. Households with 
9 members or more are more frequent in rural areas than households with only 3 
members.  
 
Table 2.9:  Household composition by residence, ENDESA 2001 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
         Residence 
Number of                                   –––––––––––––––––––– 
household members    Urban  Rural  Total  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
    1   4.4 2.8 3.8 
    2   8.4 6.4 7.6 
    3   14.3 11.8 13.3 
    4   21.0 16.3 19.1 
    5   16.7 16.1 16.4 
    6   12.4 13.5 12.9 
  7    8.2  11.4  9.5 
    8   5.4 7.6 6.3 
  9+    9.0  14.0  11.0 
   
  Total   100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Number of households    6,761  4,567  11,328 
Average number of members  5.0  5.7  5.3 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––   23
Note: Table is based on de jure members, i.e., usual residents. 
Source: INEC & MINSA (2002), Table 2.2.1.  
 
The variable that is important for our projections is the number of children younger than 
15 in the household. Actually, all we need to know is the percentage of people living in 
households that have 4 children or more. Table 2.10 shows that this percentage has 
decreased from 44.7% in 1995 to 32.6% in 2001.  
 
The total reduction in population living in households with 4 or more children has been 
larger than the reduction within each of the 4 sub-groups. This is due to the fact that there 
has been a simultaneous movement of population towards sub-groups with fewer children 
(i.e. urban and high education). 
 
Table 2.10: Trends in household size, 1995-1998-2001 
% of individuals who live in a householdwith 4 or more children 





Year  Low edu.  High edu.  Low edu.  High edu.     Total 
1995  (censo)  56.4 39.9 43.8 27.2  44.7 
1998  (EMNV)  47.4 36.1 43.0 23.8  35.8 
2001  (EMNV)  46.6 34.7 38.8 20.8  32.6 
Average annual 
growth rate in the 
population living in 
households with 4 or 











Source: Author’s calculations based on all individuals in EMNV 98 and EMNV 2001. 
 
If the trends observed between 1995 and 2001 continue, we will have the following 
percentages of individuals living in households with 4 children or more in 2015: 
 
  - Rural, low education:  29.9% 
  - Rural, high education:  25.1% 
  - Urban, low education:  29.2% 
  - Urban, high education:  11.1% 
 
These trends are not only the result of decreasing fertility, but also a result of changes in 
the patterns of living arrangements.  
 
In order to link fertility rates with the proportion of the population living in households 
with 4 or more children we make a simple interpolation between the above-mentioned 
central scenario combination and an alternative combination with zero reductions in 
fertility rates and zero changes in household size. Thus, if fertility rates on average are 
lower than in the central scenario, the proportion of people in households with few 
children in each location-education category would be higher, and vice versa. 
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2.8. Mortality assumptions for the central scenario  
 
Mortality rates are estimated and projected separately for under-fives and the rest. 
 
Under-five mortality  
 
Table 2.11 shows recent trends in infant and child mortality rates as calculated from the 
ENDESA 2001. Infant mortality rates have decreased at an average rate of 26% per 5-
year period and child mortality rates have decreased at an average rate of 20% leading to 
an overall reduction in the under-5 mortality rate of about 24% per 5-year period. The 
reduction was much larger between 1987-91 and 1992-96 (30%) than between 1992-96 
and 1997-2001 (18%). It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the rate of reduction 
in under-five mortality is slowing down. 
 
Table 2.11: Trends in infant and child mortality, ENDESA 2001  
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Years Approximate  Infant Child  Under-five 
preceding calendar  mortality mortality mortality 
the survey     year
1
  (1q0) ( 4q1)  (5q0) 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  0-4  1997-2001  31  9  40 
  5-9  1992-1996  39  11  49 
  10-14  1987-1991  57  14  70 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Notes:  
1 Because survey fieldwork was conducted from September 12  
  through December 10, the rates for the five-year period 1997-2001  
  actually apply to the calendar period from November 1996 to November 2001.   
  Similarly for the other rates. 
Source:   INEC & MINSA (2002), Table 8.1. 
 
If we assume that the under-five mortality rate will continue to be reduced by 15% for 
each 5-year period the under-five mortality rate will fall from 40 deaths per thousand 
births now to 25 per thousand births in 2015.  
 
Again, there are big differences between sub-groups. Table 2.12 shows that mortality is 
much higher in rural areas than urban areas and that mortality is very sensitive to the 
level of education of the mother. 
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Table 2.12: Infant and child mortality by background characteristics, ENDESA 2001  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  Infant Child  Under-five 
Background  mortality mortality mortality 
characteristic     (1q0) ( 4q1)  (5q0) 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Urban, low edu.         36   9  44 
Urban, high edu.          20  4  24 
Rural, low edu.         44   14  58 
Rural, high edu.          29  2  31 
   
Total  35 10 45 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Note:  Calculated for the 10-year period before the survey, approximately 1991-2001. 
Source:  Special tabulation made by Oscar Estrada at INEC based on ENDESA 2001. 
 





For the general trend in mortality, we will use the projections by INEC (n.d.) presented 
here in Table 2.13: 
 
Table 2.13: Projections for life-expectancy at birth in Nicaragua  
 Men  Women Difference
1995-2000 65.65  70.36 4.71
2000-2005 67.15  71.92 4.76
2005-2010 68.65  73.48 4.81
2010-2015 69.85  74.74 4.86
Source: INEC (n.d.)  
 
INEC (n.d.) also presents corresponding model life tables (see Table 2.14). We will use 
these survival probabilities for all our groups of age 5 and older. Only for under-fives will 
we assume different mortality patterns by household type. 
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Table 2.14: Model life tables from INEC, Nicaragua 1995-2015. 
Men        
Age group  1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015
0-4 0.95113 0.95645 0.9619 0.96609
5-9 0.98983 0.99128 0.99229 0.99308
10-14 0.99609 0.99664 0.99701 0.9973
15-19 0.99395 0.99482 0.99541 0.99587
20-24 0.98889 0.99051 0.99161 0.99245
25-29 0.98522 0.98731 0.98875 0.98985
30-34 0.98243 0.98479 0.98643 0.9877
35-39 0.97869 0.98134 0.98325 0.98472
40-44 0.97311 0.97616 0.97846 0.98023
45-49 0.96583 0.96924 0.97199 0.97411
50-54 0.95564 0.95937 0.9627 0.96527
55-59 0.9399 0.94405 0.94828 0.95154
60-64 0.91685 0.92142 0.92688 0.93109
65-69 0.88297 0.88798 0.89514 0.90067
70-74 0.83502 0.8404 0.84968 0.85683
75-79 0.76969 0.7753 0.7868 0.79566
80+ 0.52635 0.53503 0.54787 0.55769
     
Women        
Age group  1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015
0-4 0.9618 0.96581 0.96996 0.97314
5-9 0.99146 0.99263 0.99352 0.9942
10-14 0.99639 0.99689 0.99726 0.99754
15-19 0.99572 0.99632 0.99675 0.99708
20-24 0.99395 0.99479 0.9954 0.99586
25-29 0.99278 0.99376 0.99446 0.99501
30-34 0.99115 0.9923 0.99315 0.9938
35-39 0.98859 0.99001 0.99109 0.99191
40-44 0.98453 0.98638 0.9878 0.9889
45-49 0.97809 0.98059 0.98259 0.98411
50-54 0.96844 0.97188 0.9747 0.97686
55-59 0.95479 0.95946 0.96344 0.96649
60-64 0.93401 0.94042 0.94618 0.95059
65-69 0.90327 0.91201 0.9203 0.92666
70-74 0.86028 0.87166 0.8833 0.89223
75-79 0.80075 0.81471 0.83053 0.84266
80+ 0.55263 0.56615 0.58359 0.59676
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2.9. International migration assumptions for the central scenario 
 
Table 2.15 shows a dramatic increase in the number of Nicaraguans living abroad from 
less than 50,000 in the 1970s to more than 500,000 in the 1990s. This corresponds to 
annual net-migration flows in the order of 20,000 people. Some sources suggest even 
higher figures. 
 
Table 2.15: Nicaraguans living abroad, 1970-2000 
Country 1970s 1980s 1990s  2000
Costa Rica  23,331 45,918 310,000  350,000
Canada ND 270 8,545  ND
United States  16,125 44,166 168,659  178,000
Total 49,126 107,153 503,366  628,000
Population in Nicaragua  2,498,000 3,404,000 4,426,000  5,074,000
% living abroad  2.0 3.1 11.4  12.4
Source: Baumeister (2002), Table 11. 
 
While international migration flows are difficult to measure accurately, they are even 
more difficult to predict.  
 
The projections by INEC(n.d.) are very crude: 
 
 1995-2000:  60,000  persons 
 2000-2005:  30,000  persons 
 2005-2010:  20,000  persons 
 2010-2015:  10,000  persons 
 
The main reason for the expected reductions in out-migration is an expected increase in 
in-migration restrictions in receiving countries. 
 
These projections are not in agreement with Baumeister (2002) who suggests that 
Nicaragua has a big potential for generating migrants in the coming decades. He lists 
several reasons. First, the rate of growth of the working age population in Nicaragua will 
be among the highest in the world, and much higher than in the main receiving countries: 
Costa Rica, United States, Mexico and Canada. Second, domestic generation of jobs is 
unlikely to be able to keep up with the growth in the working age population. Third, 
demographic changes in receiving countries will increase the demand for cheap labor. For 
our central scenario we will assume that net international migration stays at 60,000 per 
five-year period. 
 
Differences in migration patterns by household type can be investigated using the 
ENDESA surveys. Table 2.16 indicates that the migrants to Costa Rica generally come 
from less educated households while migrants to United States come from households 
with more than average education. These differences tend to average out so that there is 
no reason to estimate separate migration tables by education level.  
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Table 2.16: Distribution of households, by migration status and education level of the 
head of household, ENDESA 1998 
 





with migrants in 
Costa Rica 
Households with 
migrants in  
United States 
Households 
with migrants in 
CR or USA 
None 31.0  35.7  17.7  29.0 
Alphabetized 2.5 2.2  1.2  1.8 
Primary 43.1  45.5  40.4  43.6 
Secondary 16.0  13.3  24.2  17.4 
Technical or more  7.4  3.3  16.5  8.2 
Total 100.0  100  100  100.0 
(obs) (12296)  (857)  (508)  (1365) 
Source: Baumeister (2002), Table 7. 
 
Migration probabilities are almost equal by sex but vary dramatically by age. INEC (n.d.) 
presents useful estimates of the sex and age-structure of migrants, which we can apply to 
the expected aggregate number of migrants within each of our sub-groups. See Table 
2.17. 
 
Table 2.17: Estimated sex and age-structure  
of international migrants 
Age-group Men  Women
0-4 1.10  1.06
5-9 3.10  3.00
10-14 3.40  3.30
15-19 7.20  5.00
20-24 10.00  7.50
25-29 9.00  7.40
30-34 6.60  5.00
35-39 4.80  4.30
40-44 3.00  3.00
45-49 1.90  2.10
50-54 1.50  1.80
55-59 0.80  0.90
60-64 0.50  0.54
65-69 0.40  0.40
70-74 0.30  0.30
75-79 0.20  0.20
80+ 0.20  0.20
Total  54.00 46.00
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2.10. Internal migration assumptions for the central scenario 
 
The distribution of the population between the three macro-regions of Nicaragua has been 
remarkably stable during the last 50 years. Table 2.18 shows that the Pacific region, 
which includes Managua, has increased its share only slightly from 55.7% in 1950 to 
57.7% in 1995. There has been some migration from the Central region to the Atlantic 
region associated with the eastward expansion of the agricultural frontier. However, for 
this study I suggest that we ignore the movement of the agricultural frontier, and 
concentrate on rural-urban migration
3. 
 
Table 2.18: Distribution of population across macro-regions, 1950-1995 
Year Pacific Central Atlantic
1950 55.7  37.0  7.3 
1995 57.7  29.8  12.5 
Source: Baumeister (2002), Table 1.13. 
 
Rural-urban migration has been important. Table 2.19 shows that the proportion of the 
population living in urban areas increased from 35.2% in 1950 to 54.4% in 1995, with the 
growth of other urban areas than Managua accounting for most of the growth, especially 
after 1971. 
 







1950 15.4  19.8  35.2 
1963 20.8  20.1  40.9 
1971 25.9  21.8  47.7 
1995 20.9  33.5  54.4 
Source: Baumeister (2002), Table 3.2. 
  
Baumeister (personal communication) predicts that urbanization will continue so that the 
degree of urbanization will reach 65% in 2015. We will therefore use the following 
projections for the urbanization rate to estimate overall rural-urban migration flows in the 
central scenario: 
 
1995:  54.4% 
2000:  57.1% 
2005:  59.7% 
2010:  62.4% 
2015:  65.0% 
 
                                                 
3 The movement of the agricultural frontier and its implications in terms of deforestation and agricultural 
productivity is much better analyzed in a geographically explicit framework using information from 
satellite images combined with municipal level data on economic variables. This has been done with great 
success for the Brazilian Amazon by Eustáquio J. Reis and others at IPEA in Rio de Janeiro.     30
Table 2.20 shows that the 126,266 people who had moved in the five-year period before 
the 1995 census were slightly better educated than those who had not moved. The 
difference, however is small and in the model we will assume that different education 
groups have the same migration probabilities. 
 









Men 3.80  3.62  3.62 
Women 4.06  3.85  3.86 
Total 3.94  3.73  3.74 
Source: Special tabulations made by Jorge Rodriguez at CEPAL using the 1995 census.  
 
Table 2.21 shows that women have a slightly higher migration propensity than men, but 
again the differences are so small that it is not necessary to take it into account in the 
simulation model. 
 









Men 47.2%  49.0%  48.9% 
Women 52.8%  51.0%  51.1% 
Total 100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Source: Special tabulations made by Jorge Rodriguez at CEPAL using the 1995 census.  
  
Table 2.22 shows that the age-groups 0-4, 15-24, and 30-39 are over-represented among 
the migrants, whereas children of primary school age (5-14) are under-represented. 
People over 40 are also generally under-represented among the migrants. This seems 
quite reasonable, so we will use the estimated age-distribution for Migrants in Table 23 to 
distribute our total number of rural-urban migrants among age-groups. 
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Table 2.22: Age distribution of rural migrants and rural non-migrants, 1998 
 







0-4 17.4  14.3  15.5 
5-9 15.1  16.0  15.7 
10-14 12.3  14.6  13.7 
15-19 12.7  12.2  12.4 
20-24 10.3  7.8  8.8 
25-29 6.4  6.6  6.5 
30-34 5.3  4.6  4.8 
35-39 5.1  4.6  4.8 
40-44 3.2  3.9  3.7 
45-49 2.4  3.4  3.0 
50-54 2.4  3.2  2.9 
55-59 1.9  2.5  2.3 
60-64 1.7  1.5  1.6 
65-69 1.4  1.3  1.3 
70-74 0.7  0.9  0.8 
75-80 0.5  0.7  0.6 
80+ 1.3  1.0  1.1 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EMNV 98 and EMNV 2001. 
 
 
2.11. Education assumptions for the central scenario 
 
Table 2.23 shows the percentage of individuals who live in households where at least one 
person has completed 4 years of high school. Overall this percentage increased from 
29.2% in 1995 to 34.9% in 2001. This corresponds to an average annual increase of 
3.0%, but with the largest increases taking place in rural areas.  
 
Table 2.23: Trends in education levels, 1995-1998-2001 
  % of individuals who live in a household where 
at least one person has completed high school
Year Rural Urban Total   
1995 9.0  46.3  29.2 
1998 14.4  46.6  31.9 










Source: Author’s calculations based on all individuals in EMNV 98 and EMNV 2001. 
 
For the central scenario, we will assume that education levels keep improving at these 
rates. This will imply that about 37% of rural individuals and 60% of urban individuals   32
will live in households with at least 4 years of secondary education in 2015. This does not 
seem unrealistic. 
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CHAPTER 3: SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE CENTRAL 
SCENARIO 
 
The central scenario assumptions presented in the previous chapter are considered the 
“most likely” and in this section we present the predictions that arise from these 
assumptions. Per capita GDP growth is fixed at an average of 2.0 percent per year, while 
the improvement in the income distribution is fixed at an average of –0.3 GINI points per 
year, amounting to a reduction in the GINI coefficient of 6 percentage points over the 20 
year period from 1995 to 2015. These and other important assumptions are subjected to a 
thorough sensitivity analysis in Chapter 5. 
 
 
3.1. Population structure 
 
The expected continued fall in fertility combined with lower mortality will cause a 
significant change in the age pyramid over the 1995-2015 period. The share of the 
population of age 0-14 year olds will decrease from 45.1 percent in 1995 to 30.8 percent 
in 2015 (see Figure 3.1). The age groups of 65 + will increase, but only from 3.5 percent 
of the population to 4.9 percent of the population. Overall a dramatic decrease in the 
dependency burden is predicted. 
 
Figure 3.1: Age distribution of the population in the base scenario, 1995-2015. 
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The dependency burden is predicted to fall from 0.95 in 1995 to 0.55 in 2015, but the 
most dramatic fall is expected among the extremely poor, where we will see a fall from 
1.50 in 1995 to 0.67 in 2015 (see Figure 3.2).   34
 

































The expected fall in fertility rates in the base scenario will cause the crude birth rate to 
fall from an average of 31.9 births per 1000 people during the period 1995-2000 to 19.9 
during the period 2010-2015 and the overall population growth rate is predicted to fall 
from 2.5 percent per year in 1995-2000 to 1.4 in 2010-2015. Due to rural-urban 
migration, the growth rate of the urban population is much higher than the growth rate of 
the rural population (see Figure 3.3). During the 2010-2015 period the rural population is 
expected to experience no growth at all. 
   















































Rural Urban Whole population
 
   35
The population of working age (15-64 years) will increase dramatically from 2.2 million 
in 1995 to 4.1 million in 2015. This means that an average of 95,000 new jobs are needed 
every year to keep the population occupied. By far the most of the new jobs are needed in 
urban areas where the working age population increases by an average of 73,500 persons 
per year. The rural working age population only increases by an average of 21,600 
persons per year (see Figure 3.4). 
 

















































The population group including school starters (5-9 year olds) is predicted to increase 
from 635 thousand in 1995 to 712 thousand in 2005. Thereafter it is predicted to start 
falling, getting down to 666,000 in 2015. Despite a stagnating number of births, there will 
be an increasing demand for schooling, especially in urban areas, due to increasing 





Due to social mobility, rural-urban migration, improvements in education, and the fall in 
fertility, extreme poverty as well as poverty in general are predicted to fall over the 1995-
2015 period. In rural areas, extreme poverty is predicted to fall from 31.3 percent in 1995 
to 24.9 percent in 2015. In urban areas a much smaller reduction is predicted from 10.1 
percent to 9.4 percent (see Figure 3.5). Overall extreme poverty is predicted to fall from 
19.8 percent in 1995 to 14.8 percent in 2015 under the central scenario. 
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Rural Urban Whole population
 
 
Poverty in general (extreme poverty plus moderate poverty) is unfortunately not predicted 
to fall much, and in urban areas it is actually predicted to increase from 34.3 percent in 
1995 to 38.8 percent in 2015. In rural areas the poverty rate is expected to fall from 69.5 
percent in 1995 to 64.5 percent in 2015 (see Figure 3.6). Overall the expected fall in the 
poverty rate is expected to be from 50.4 in 1995 to 47.9 in 2015. 
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CHAPTER 4: COUNTERFACTUAL SIMULATIONS 
In this chapter we will try to disentangle the effects of migration, education, fertility 
changes, and macroeconomic performance on the evolution of poverty and other key 
variables. This is done by running counterfactual simulations and comparing them with 
the base scenario.  
 
 
4.1. Counterfactual scenario with no rural-urban migration 
 
In order to evaluate the effect of migration we run a counterfactual simulation where 
rural-urban migration is set at zero and compare the results with the base scenario. Figure 
4.1 shows that total extreme poverty is 6.6 percent lower in 2015 when rural-urban 
migration is allowed compared to the situation where rural-urban migration is artificially 
prevented.  Urban extreme poverty, however, is 37.5 percent higher in 2015 with 
migration than it would have been if rural-urban migration was prevented.   
 



























































A similar, but less extreme, effect is noted on overall poverty which decreases by 2.9 
percent when rural-urban migration is allowed, while urban poverty increases by 14.5 
percent (see Figure 4.2). 
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4.2. Counterfactual scenario with no international migration 
 
International migration has virtually no effect on poverty and extreme poverty as the 
propensity to migrate is approximately the same for poor and non-poor. 
 
It does have a significant effect on the size of the working age population in Nicaragua, 
however. The total working age population would be about 218,000 persons (or 5.3 
percent) larger in 2015 if international migration was not allowed, compared to the 
central scenario of net international migration of 60,000 people per five-year period.  
 
 
4.3. Counterfactual scenario with no changes in fertility 
 
The expected fertility reductions in the base scenario has a large impact on poverty. 
When the base scenario is compared to a scenario where fertility rates are maintained 
constant at the 1995-2000 levels, we see in Figure 4.3 that extreme poverty is predicted to 
be 12.8 percent lower in 2015 due to the fertility reduction. The advantage of the fertility 
reductions are slightly larger in urban areas than in rural areas.   39
























































The effect of fertility reductions on overall poverty is similar, but slightly smaller in 
magnitude. The expected fertility reductions are predicted to reduce poverty by 6.4 
percent in 2015 compared to a scenario where no fertility reductions occur. 
 























































Due to the 15-year lag, fertility reductions will only affect the working age population 
towards the end of our prediction period, and the effect is very small compared to the 
effect of international migration. 
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4.4. Counterfactual scenario with no changes in education 
 
In order to evaluate the effect of education improvements we compare the base scenario 
with a scenario where the proportion of people living in households with high education 
levels is kept constant at the 1995 level. We see in Figure 4.5 that the expected 
improvements in education would reduce extreme poverty by 5.3 percent in 2015 
compared to the scenario where no education improvements take place. The effect of 
education improvements is bigger in rural areas, since the education improvements are 
assumed to be larger there as indicated by past experience (see Section 2.11). 
 



























































The effect of education on overall poverty is very similar with a 4.2 percent reduction in 
poverty in 2015 attributable to education improvements (see Figure 4.6). 
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4.5. Counterfactual scenario with no changes in the GINI coefficient 
 
In order to evaluate the importance of changes in the income distribution on the incidence 
of poverty we compare the base scenario which assumed a 0.3 percentage point reduction 
in the GINI coefficient per year with a scenario where there are no changes in the GINI 
coefficient. 
 
Figure 4.7 shows that the assumed reduction of the GINI coefficient in the base scenario 
has a large effect on extreme poverty. With just a 0.3 point reduction in the GINI 
coefficient each year, extreme poverty would be 12.1 percent lower in 2015 than in the 
scenario with no change in the GINI coefficient. The effect of the improvements in the 
income distribution is predicted to be slightly higher in urban areas than in rural areas. 
   42























































As expected, the effect of improvements in the income distribution is less dramatic on 
poverty than on extreme poverty. Poverty in 2015 is expected to be 4.3 percent lower due 
to improvements in the income distribution (see Figure 4.8). 
 























































4.6. Counterfactual scenarios with no per capita GDP growth 
 
In the base scenario we assumed a per capita GDP growth rate of 2.0 percent per year. To 
see the effect of general growth, we compare the base scenario to a scenario with zero  
growth.    43
 
The difference of 2.0 percentage points per capita GDP growth are predicted to cause a 
13.9 percent difference in extreme poverty and a 5.0 percent difference in overall poverty 
(see Figures 4.9 and 4.10). The effect of growth is more important in urban areas than in 
rural areas. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS 
 
This chapter evaluates the relative importance of the different socio-economic and 
demographic factors considered in the simulation model. At the same time it conducts a 
sensitivity analysis on the most important assumptions in model. 
 
For each of the main factors determining population growth and poverty, we determine  
plausible probability distributions for the exogenous variables and through bootstrapping 
we determine the associated probability distribution for endogenous variables, such as 
extreme poverty incidence in 2015, poverty incidence in 2015, size of the working age 
population in 2015, size of the population aged 5-9 in 2015, etc. 
 
 
5.1. Rural-urban migration 
 
The rural-urban migration parameter to be chosen in the model is the target urbanization 
ratio in 2015. In the central scenario we have fixed this parameter at 65.0 percent, but 
below we will attach a Normal probability distribution with mean 65.0 and a standard 
deviation of 2.0. This results in in a probability distribution for this parameter as depicted 
in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1: Probability distribution for the urbanization ratio in 2015. 




If we randomly draw a large number of target urbanization ratios in 2015 from this 
probability distribution and insert each of those in the simulation model one at a time, we 
can obtain probability distributions for the endogenous variables of interest. Figure 5.2, 
for example, shows the resulting probability distribution for the Extreme Poverty 
Incidence in 2015. We see that the mean is 14.8 as predicted in the central scenario. In 95 
percent of the cases extreme poverty was predicted to fall within the range from 14.4 to 
15.2 percent, which is a relatively short range spanning only 0.8 percentage points. This 
indicates that the speed of urbanization is not a main determinant of extreme poverty, at 
least not within a plausible range of urbanization ratios. 
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Figure 5.2: Probability distribution for extreme poverty in 2015, given the probability 
distribution for the urbanization ratio in 2015 shown in Figure 5.1. 
Frequency Chart
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Forecast: Extreme Poverty Incidence 2015
 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the corresponding probability distribution for the general poverty 
incidence in 2015. The mean is 47.9 percent as predicted in the central scenario, and in 95 
percent of the cases the poverty incidence fell in the range 47.3 to 48.4. The range is thus 
1.1 percentage point, and we will use this number later in this chapter, when assessing the 
relative importance of the different socio-economic and demographic factors in the 
explanation of the extent of poverty. 
 
Figure 5.3: Probability distribution for poverty in 2015, given the probability distribution 
for the urbanization ratio in 2015 shown in Figure 5.1. 
Frequency Chart
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5.2. International migration 
 
The parameters determining international migration in the model are the number of net 
migrants for each of the 5-year periods 1995-2000, 2000-205, 2005-2010, and 2010-
2015. In the central scenario we have assumed net international migration to stay at 
60,000 per 5-year period until 2015. Here we will assume a Normal probability 
distribution with mean 60,000 and standard deviation 10,000 reflecting the large 
uncertainty about migration in the future. This results in a probability distribution as 
depicted in Figure 5.4 for each 5-year period. The probabilities are assumed to be 
perfectly correlated, so that if we have high net migration in one five-year period, we 
would also have high net-migration in the following. 
 
Figure 5.4: Probability distribution for the average number of net international 
migration per 5-year period 
30,000.00 45,000.00 60,000.00 75,000.00 90,000.00
International migration per 5-year perio
 
 
Since the propensity to migrate is very similar across different poverty groups and 
household types, international migration do not affect poverty rates in a significant 
manner. Figure 5.5 shows the resulting probability distribution with a mean of 14.8 
percent and a very small variance, that does not even register when measured with the 
accuracy of only one decimal.  
 
Although international migration is not important for overall poverty rates in Nicaragua, 
it may be important for the individuals who migrate. It may also be important for the 
families who are left behind, if they receive substantial remittances. This topic has not 
been explored in this report, although it is potentially very important for Nicaragua.    47
Figure 5.5: Probability distribution for extreme poverty in 2015, given the probability 
distribution for international migration rates shown in Figure 5.4. 
Frequency Chart
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Forecast: Extreme Poverty Rate in 2015
 
 
While international migration does not affect the overall poverty rates in our model, it 
does affect the size of the working age population in Nicaragua. Figure 5.6 shows that 
alternative migration rates may result in a working age population in 2015 ranging from 
4,069 thousand to 4,213 thousand. With low net migration rates we would need about 
150,000 more jobs in Nicaragua in 2015 than we would with high net migration rates. 
 
Figure 5.6: Probability distribution for working age population in 2015, given the 
probability distribution for international migration rates shown in Figure 5.4. 
Frequency Chart
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5.3. Fertility 
 
The changes in fertility over time are governed by 5 parameters indicating (one minus) 
the rate of fertility reduction for 15-19 year old women, 20-24 year old women, 25-30 
year old women, 30-34 year old women, and women of 35 years or more, respectively. In 
the central scenario fertility reduction was 11 percent per 5-year period for 15-19 year 
olds, 14 percent for 20-24 year olds, 18 percent for 25-29 year olds, 20 percent for 30-34 
year olds, and 28 percent for women of 35 or more. We use the central scenario 
parameters as means for the probability distributions of these parameters and choose the 
standard deviation to be 0.02 for the first two age groups and 0.03 for the remaining. This 
leads to the distributions shown in Figures 5.7a-e. The fertility reduction for 15-19 year 
olds were assumed to be independent from the fertility reductions of the other age groups, 
whereas the fertility reductions of the other five age-groups were assumed to be highly 
correlated (with a correlation coefficient of 0.75). 
 
Figure 5.7a-e: Probability distribution for age-specific fertility reduction factors per 5-
year period 
0.83 0.86 0.89 0.92 0.95
Fertility reduction 15-19
 
                    (a)           
0.80 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.92
Fertility reduction 20-25
 
                                       (b)   49
 
0.73 0.78 0.82 0.87 0.91
Fertility reduction 25-29
 
                         (c) 
0.71 0.76 0.80 0.85 0.89
Fertility reduction 30-34
 
      (d) 
0.60 0.66 0.72 0.78 0.84
Fertility reduction 35+
 
                   (e) 
 
Figure 5.8 shows the resulting probability distribution for the extreme poverty incidence 
in 2015. The mean is 14.8 percent as in the central scenario, and the 95 percent 
confidence interval is goes from 14.4 to 15.2 percent. 
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Figure 5.8: Probability distribution for extreme poverty in 2015, given the probability 
distributions for fertility reductions shown in Figure 5.7. 
Frequency Chart
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Forecast: Extreme Poverty Rate in 2015
 
 
The corresponding probability distribution for overall poverty in 2015 is presented in 
Figure 5.9 with a mean of 48.5 and a 95 percent confidence interval ranging from 47.9 to 
48.5.  
 
Figure 5.9: Probability distribution for poverty in 2015, given the probability 
distributions for fertility reductions shown in Figure 5.7. 
Frequency Chart
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Because of the 15 year lag before fertility reductions shows its effect on the size of the 
working age population, alternative fertility assumptions will not provide large 
discrepancies in the working age population within our prediction period of only 20 
years. The probability distribution for the working age population is presented in Figure 
5.10, which shows that 95% of the cases fall within the short range of 4,141 thousand and 
4,143 thousand. 
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Figure 5.10: Probability distribution for working age population in 2015, given the 
probability distributions for fertility reductions shown in Figure 5.7. 
Frequency Chart
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The size of the population group starting school around 2015 (the 5-9 year olds), on the 
other hand, is much more sensitive to fertility assumptions. Figure 5.11 shows the 
probability distribution for the size of this age-group in 2015. It has a mean of 667 
thousand, but the 95 percent confidence interval is quite large ranging from 612 thousand 
to 720 thousand. 
 
Figure 5.11: Probability distribution for the number of 5-9 year olds in 2015, given the 
probability distributions for fertility reductions shown in Figure 5.7. 
Frequency Chart
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5.4. Education 
 
In the base scenario we assume that the number of persons living in households with high 
education levels increases by 36.9 percent per five year period in rural areas and by 6.6 
percent in urban areas. This assumption is based on a continuation of the trends observed 
during the 1995 – 2001 period.  
 
In the present sensitivity analysis, however, we assume that the large difference between 
rural and urban areas observed in the period 1995-2001 was partly due to random 
variation, and we will choose probability distributions that have a mean of 25.0 percent 
for rural areas and 15.0 percent for urban areas. For both locations, we will choose 
standard deviations of 0.05, which then results in the probability distributions depicted in 
Figure 5.12a-b. 
 
Figure 5.12a-b: Probability distribution for education improvement factors in rural and 
urban areas per 5-year period 
0.100 0.175 0.250 0.325 0.400
Rural education improvements
 
        (a) 
0.000 0.075 0.150 0.225 0.300
Urban education improvements
 
        (b) 
 
These assumptions result in a probability distribution for extreme poverty in 2015 as 
depicted in Figure 5.13. The mean extreme poverty incidence is 14.9 percent (slightly 
larger than the 14.8 percent in the central scenario and in 95 percent of the cases extreme 
poverty fell in the short range from 14.6 to 15.2. 
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Figure 5.13: Probability distribution for extreme poverty in 2015, given the probability 
distributions for fertility reductions shown in Figure 5.12. 
Frequency Chart
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The corresponding probability distribution for overall poverty in 2015 is given in Figure 
5.14. The mean is 47.6 percent with a 95 percent confidence interval ranging from 46.5 to 
48.7. 
 
Figure 5.14: Probability distribution for poverty in 2015, given the probability 
distributions for fertility reductions shown in Figure 5.12. 
Frequency Chart
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The simulations indicate that education is more effective in reducing moderate poverty 
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5.5. Changes in the income distribution 
 
To evaluate the impact of changes in the income distribution, we assume of Normal 
probability distribution for the average annual percentage point change in the GINI 
coefficient. We assume the mean to be –0.10 and standard deviation to be 0.15, which 
would result in a distribution as pictured in Figure 5.15. 
 
Figure 5.15: Probability distribution for the annual change in the GINI coefficient 
-0.55 -0.33 -0.10 0.13 0.35
Average annual change in GINI
 
 
The impact on extreme poverty in 2015 of alternative values for the changes in the GINI 
coefficient is shown in Figure 5.16. The mean is 16.2 percent, which is larger than the 
mean for the central scenario (14.8) because the mean reduction in GINI is assumed to be 
less than in the central scenario. The 95 percent confidence interval is large, ranging from 
14.3 to 18.2 percent. 
 
 
Figure 5.16: Probability distribution for extreme poverty in 2015 given the GINI 
coefficient distribution in Figure 5.15 
Frequency Chart
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The corresponding distribution for the overall poverty rate in 2015 is presented in Figure 
5.17. In 95 percent of the cases, the overall poverty rate fell in the range 47.3 to 51.5, and 
the mean was 49.3 percent.   55
 
 
Figure 5.17: Probability distribution for the overall poverty rate in 2015 given the GINI 
coefficient distribution in Figure 5.15 
Frequency Chart
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5.6. Per capita GDP growth rates 
 
In the past Nicaragua has experienced both prolonged periods of high per capita GDP 
growth rates and prolonged periods of negative growth rates. In the central scenario we 
have assumed average per capita GDP growth rates over 20 years of 2.0 percent per year. 
We will choose this as the mean for our probability distribution. Combined with a 
standard deviation of 0.75, this secures that negative growth rates are possible, but not 
very likely, and that a sustained growth of 4 percent per year over 20 years is possible, 
but not very likely. See Figure 5.18.  
 
Figure 5.18: Probability distribution for annual per capita GDP growth rate, 1995-2015. 
-0.25 0.88 2.00 3.13 4.25
Average annual GDP growth
 
 
By drawing random growth rates from this probability distribution and simulating 
extreme poverty for each of these we get a probability distribution for the extreme 
poverty incidence in 2015 as shown in Figure 5.19. The mean is 14.8 percent and 95 
percent of the cases fell in the range 13.2 to 16.6 percent.  
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Figure 5.19: Probability distribution for extreme poverty in 2015 given the growth 
distribution in Figure 5.18 
Frequency Chart











12.5 13.8 15.0 16.3 17.5
1,997 Trials
Forecast: Extreme Poverty Rate in 2015
 
 
Using the same growth probability distribution and simulating the overall poverty rate in 
2015 gives the probability distribution for the poverty rate in 2015 as depicted in Figure 
5.20. The mean is 47.9 and 95 percent of the cases fell in the range between 46.1 and 49.7 
percent.  
 
Figure 5.20: Probability distribution for the poverty rate in 2015 given the growth 
distribution in Figure 5.18 
Frequency Chart
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5.7. The relative importance of different socio-economic and demographic 
factors 
 
In this section we will summarize the influence of each of the factors analyzed in this 
chapter and compare their relative importance. Table 5.1 lists the 6 main factors that have 
been analyzed together with the predicted range of extreme poverty and poverty that 
alternative plausible assumptions about each factor would generate.  
 
The results indicate that changes in the GINI coefficient and general economic growth are 
the two most important factors, since alternative plausible values for these variables 
generate the widest range of possible values for the poverty rate in 2015. 
 
Education improvements and fertility reductions come out as the third and fourth most 
influential factors.  
 
Rural-urban migration has an effect on poverty that is relatively limited, which is mostly 
the result of the limited range of plausible urbanization rates in 2015. Urbanization is 
destined to proceed at a steady pace, and it is most unlikely to be reversed. Thus, the level 
of uncertainty surrounding the rate of urbanization is much smaller than the uncertainty 
surrounding the changes in income distribution. 
 
Finally, international migration is not found to have any significant impact on the overall 
poverty rate in 2015. 
 
Table 5.1: The relative importance of different socio-economic and demographic factors 
Factor  Extreme Poverty Range 
[95% confidence interval] 
Poverty Range  
[95% confidence interval] 
GINI changes        3.9   /     [14.3:18.2]              4.2   /   [47.3:51.5] 
GDP growth        3.4   /     [13.2:16.6]          3.6   /   [46.1:49.7] 
Education improvement        0.6   /     [14.6:15.2]          2.2   /   [46.5:48.7]     
Fertility reduction        0.8   /     [14.4:15.2]              1.3   /   [47.2:48.5]    
Rural-urban migration        0.8   /     [14.4:15.2]             1.1   /   [47.3:48.4]      
International migration        0.0   /     [14.8:14.8]             0.0   /   [47.9:47.9]      
 
Thus, while education, location, and number of children in the household all are very 
important factors determining poverty at the individual level, these factors do not have a 
large impact on aggregate poverty, simply because at the aggregate level these factors can 
vary only little (compared to GDP growth and changes in the income distribution). For 
example, the urbanization ratio in 2015 is going to be somewhere close to 65 percent, 
conceivably it could be as low as 60 percent or as high as 70, but the uncertainty about 
the urbanization ratio in 2015 is much smaller than the uncertainty about the average 
change in the GINI coefficient between 1995 and 2015.  
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5.8. Probabilistic analysis of main endogenous variables 
 
So far in this chapter, we have varied each parameter one at a time to see how its 
influence is on key endogenous variables. Now we will vary them all at the same time in 
order to establish overall confidence intervals for key variables. We use exactly the same 
probability distributions as shown in Figures 5.1, 5.4, 5.7, 5.12, 5.15, and 5.18 above. The 
only parameters that were assumed to be correlated was the fertility reductions, as 
explained in section 5.3. The rest were assumed to vary independently.  
 
Several other parameters in the model, such as survival probabilities, are assumed be 
known relatively accurately, compared to the abovementioned 11 parameters, so that we 
can assume zero variance on these for the purposes of this report. 
 
When drawing a large number of values from each of the 11 probability distribution and 
inserting them in the simulation model, we get a large number of values for each of the 
endogenous variables that we can use to create overall probability distributions. 
 
Figure 5.21 shows the resulting overall probability distribution for the extreme poverty 
incidence in 2015. The mean is 16.2 percent and the 95 percent confidence interval 
ranges from 13.6 percent to 19.0 percent, and from the analysis above we know that this 
wide range is mainly caused by the uncertainty surrounding changes in the income 
distribution and the rate of per capita GDP growth. 
 
Figure 5.21: Probability distribution for the extreme poverty incidence in 2015 given the 
11 probability distributions in Figures 5.1, 5.4, 5.7, 5.12, 5.15, and 5.18. 
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Figure 5.22 shows the predicted mean and 95% confidence interval for extreme poverty 
over time. Extreme poverty is expected to fall, but the 95% confidence interval is so large 
that it includes the possibility of no reduction at all, if several conditions conspire against 
it. 
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Figure 5.22: Predicted mean and 95% confidence interval for the extreme poverty 
incidence, 2000-2015, given the 11 probability distributions in Figures 5.1, 5.4, 5.7, 5.12, 





































The expected reduction in overall poverty is even less than the expected reduction in 
extreme poverty, and Figure 5.23 shows that a 50% reduction is completely out of the 
question. Anything more than a 10 percent reduction in poverty between 1995 and 2015 
appear to be unrealistic, given the present structure of the population and economy of 
Nicaragua.  
 
Figure 5.23: Predicted mean and 95% confidence interval for the overall poverty rate, 
































Figure 5.24 shows that urban poverty is very unlikely to fall over the next 15 years, given 
the influx of poor, uneducated people from rural areas. Providing adequate basic services 
and jobs for the rapidly growing urban population should be an important priority over 
the coming decades, in order to prevent urban poverty from increasing.    60
Figure 5.24: Predicted mean and 95% confidence interval for the urban poverty rate, 





































While there is quite large uncertainty associated with poverty rates, the size of the 
working age population and the dependency ratios can be quite accurately predicted. 
 
Figure 5.25 shows the dramatic increase in the size of the working age population, from 
2,239 thousand in 1995 to around 4,140 thousand in 2015. In order to keep these people 
occupied, an average of 95,000 new jobs would have to be created per year. At least 80 
percent of the new jobs should be located in urban areas, as that is where the most rapid 
increase in working age population is expected.  
 
Figure 5.25: Predicted mean and 95% confidence interval for the size of the working age 
population, 2000-2015, given the 11 probability distributions in Figures 5.1, 5.4, 5.7, 











































Figure 3.26 shows the dramatic fall in the dependency ratio predicted by the model. The 
dependency ratio was 0.95 in 1995, and by 2015 it will have fallen below 0.60.   61
 
Figure 5.26: Predicted mean and 95% confidence interval for the dependency ratio, 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
This report has presented the methodology used to make simulataneous poverty and 
population projections for Nicaragua. 
 
The results show that at the individual level, the level of education in the household is by 
far the most important characteristic determining the level of poverty, the degree of 
vulnerability, and the degree of upward social mobility. Number of children below 15 in 
the household is also an important determinant of poverty, with many children (4 or 
more) causing higher poverty, higher vulnerability, and less upward mobility. Location is 
also important with people in rural areas generally being more poor and more vulnerable. 
There are exceptions to this rule, however. Individuals living in rural households with 
high levels of education (at least one person with 4 years of secondary) and few children 
(3 or less) are very unlikely to become worse off over time and very likely to improve 
their situation (low vulnerability and high upward social mobility).  
 
Gender was found to have no influence on neither poverty nor social mobility. Poverty 
and vulnerability were found to decrease with age, and upward mobility to increase with 
age. This makes sense since people build up assets (both human, physical, and social) 
over their lives, and this should make them less poor and less vulnerable as they get 
older. This result may be somewhat exaggerated, however, because of the lack of use of 
equivalence scales in the calculation of poverty lines. In essence, the 4
th child in a 
household is assumed to need the same amount of resources as the first adult, which is 
clearly not the case. This means that the degree of poverty is generally exaggerated in 
households with many members (usually many children). 
 
At the national level, the most important variables determining poverty and social 
mobility are changes in the income distribution and economic growth. Thus, growth is 
essential for the reduction of poverty in Nicaragua, and the more pro-poor, the better. An 
important supporting measure that would contribute to reducing poverty is to help 
families avoid having too many children. Education improvements is also a very 
important policy initiative, which is particularly pro-poor.  
 
Rural-urban migration is found to help reduce aggregate poverty, but it contributes to 
increasing urban poverty. This means that special attention is needed to secure that the 
new migrants arriving to urban areas get adequately and quickly integrated into the urban 
society with all basic services and as well as job possibilities.  
 
Job creation is going to be a big challenge over the coming decades, as the working age 
population in Nicaragua will grow dramatically from 2.2 million people in 1995 to about 
4.1 million in 2015. This means that around 95,000 new jobs are needed every year in 
order to keep the population occupied, and 74,000 of these will be needed in urban areas. 
 
The number of children under 15, is expected to reach a maximum of 2.1 million in 2005 
and then start falling slowly to just under 2 million in 2015. This does not imply that the   63
need for schools will fall, however, since there is ample room to increase the enrollment 
rates.  
 
The size of the population of people over 65 is still very small in Nicaragua, but it is 
expected to more than double from 152 thousand in 1995 to 313 thousand in 2015. 
 
The rapid growth of the working age population together with the fall in number of 
children and the moderate increase in people over 65, implies that the dependency burden 
in Nicaragua is destined to fall dramatically. This is a one-time advantage caused by the 
demographic transition that the country is undergoing, and it is going to help reduce 
poverty during the coming couple of decades. 
 
However, even under the most favorable conditions, there is no way poverty could be 
reduced by half by 2015. Actually, anything more than a 10 percent reduction seem 
unrealistic given the present structure of the population and the economy. Extreme 
poverty could be reduced by up to 30 percent under the most favorable conditions, but a 
15 percent reduction seem more realistic. 
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APPENDIX A: CHOICE OF RELEVANT STATES 
This appendix analysis poverty and social mobility by: 
 
•  Area/region of residence 
•  Number of children in the household 
•  Number of adults in the household 
•  Sex 
•  Sex of the head of household 
•  Education level in the household 
•  Age 
 
The most important characteristics were found to be: 
 
•  Education level in household 
•  Area of residence 
•  Number of children in the household. 
 




7.1. Area/region of residence 
 
Tables A1 and A2 show that rural individuals are substantially more poor than urban 
individuals and that rural individuals are much more vulnerable and less upwardly mobile 
than urban individuals. Thus, area of residence is an important characteristic to take into 
account. 
 
Table A1: Poverty at the individual level, by area of residence, 2001  
  Area of residence in 2001 
Poverty classi-
fication in 2001 
Urban Rural Total 
Extreme Poverty  0.062 0.273 0.150 
Moderate Poverty  0.239 0.404 0.308 
Non-Poor  0.699 0.323 0.542 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Note: Based on the 22810 individuals of the EMNV 2001 using the expansion factor PESO2.  
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Table A2:  Markov Transition Matrices, by area of residence, 1998-2001  












Extreme Poverty  0.437 0.408 0.155  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.116 0.499 0.385  1.000
Urban 
 
Non-Poor  0.005 0.111 0.884  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.507 0.402 0.091  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.187 0.476 0.337  1.000
Rural 
Non-Poor  0.038 0.252 0.710  1.000
Note: Author’s estimation based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from EMNV 1998 and 2001 
using the expansion factor PESO2. Not adjusted. 
 
Table A3 shows the variation in poverty levels across the 7 major regions of Nicaragua. 
The Managua region is the least poor and the rural Atlantic region the most poor. 
Extreme poverty is highest in the rural Central region. In general the four urban regions 
are less poor than the three rural regions, and the rural-urban dichotomy seems a 
reasonable simplification. 
 
Table A3: Poverty at the individual level, by region, 2001  
  Poverty classification in 2001 







Managua  0.025 0.178 0.798  1.000
Pacific urban   0.062 0.296 0.641  1.000
Pacific rural  0.147 0.409 0.444  1.000
Central urban  0.121 0.230 0.649  1.000
Central rural   0.339 0.366 0.295  1.000
Atlantic urban  0.129 0.300 0.572  1.000
Atlantic rural  0.269 0.496 0.235  1.000
Note: Based on the 22810 individuals of the EMNV 2001 using the expansion factor PESO2.  
 
 
Tables A4 and A5 show that the two regions where people are most vulnerable (prone to 
downward mobility) is the rural Atlantic region and the rural Central region. People in the 
rural Pacific region are much less vulnerable and more upwardly mobile, so much so that 
they are more similar to urban individuals in terms of social mobility. People are most 
upwardly mobile in the Pacific region, both in rural and urban areas. This means that the 
rural-urban dichotomy is not so good in terms of social mobility.  
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Table A4:  Markov Transition Matrices, by region, 1998-2001  
    Poverty classification in 2001 
Region Poverty  classifica-








Extreme Poverty  0.387 0.451 0.163  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.078 0.473 0.449  1.000
Managua 
 
Non-Poor  0.000 0.111 0.889  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.300 0.557 0.143  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.096 0.523 0.381  1.000
Pacific urban 
Non-Poor  0.010 0.135 0.855  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.348 0.518 0.134  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.124 0.470 0.407  1.000
Pacific rural 
Non-Poor  0.025 0.216 0.759  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.594 0.313 0.093  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.176 0.413 0.411  1.000
Central urban 
Non-Poor  0.007 0.102 0.891  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.641 0.300 0.059  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.260 0.458 0.282  1.000
Central rural 
Non-Poor  0.071 0.260 0.669  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.538 0.263 0.199  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.127 0.612 0.261  1.000
Atlantic urban 
Non-Poor  0.016 0.197 0.787  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.363 0.501 0.136  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.153 0.597 0.250  1.000
Atlantic rural 
Non-Poor  0.062 0.390 0.547  1.000
Note: Author’s estimation based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from EMNV 1998 and 2001 
using the expansion factor PESO2. Not adjusted. 
 
 
Table A5:  Indices of Vulnerability and Upward Mobility, by region, 1998-2001  
Household type in 1998  







Managua 0.189 1.063 
Pacific urban  0.241 1.081 
Pacific rural  0.365 1.059 
Central urban  0.285 0.817 
Central rural  0.591 0.641 
Atlantic urban  0.340 0.723 
Atlantic rural  0.605 0.887 
Note: Author’s estimation based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from EMNV 1998  
and 2001 using the expansion factor PESO2.    68
7.2. Number of children in household 
 
Table A6 shows that there is a clear relationship between number of children in the 
household and the level of poverty. The extreme poverty incidence is more than 10 times 
higher for individuals living in households with 5 or more children under 15 years of age 
than for individuals living in households with no children at all. 
 
This may be partly deceptive, however, since the poverty level is calculated under the 
assumption that each individual in the household needs the same amount of resources, 
which is obviously not true. The marginal expenses necessary to house, feed, and dress 
the third or fourth child in a household are much smaller than the marginal expenses 
necessary to house, feed, and dress a single adult.  
 
In order to get a more accurate picture of the importance of children in the household 
poverty lines should be set using equivalence scales, which attach weights less than one 
to additional household members. In this report, however, we stay with the official 
poverty lines from INEC, which do not use equivalence scales. 
 
Table A6: Poverty at the individual level, by number of children in household, 2001  
  Number of children younger than 15 years of age in 
household in 2001 
Poverty classi-
fication in 2001 
0 1-2 3-4 5 or 
more 
Total 
Extreme Poverty  0.031 0.064 0.175 0.360  0.150 
Moderate Poverty  0.130 0.245 0.361 0.457  0.308 
Non-Poor  0.839 0.692 0.464 0.183  0.542 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 
Note: Based on the 22810 individuals of the EMNV 2001 using the expansion factor PESO2.  
 
Table A7 shows that there is not a strong relationship between social mobility and 
number of children in the household, but that households with more children tend to be 
more vulnerable than households with less children.  
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Table A7:  Markov Transition Matrices, by number of children in household, 1998-2001  












Extreme Poverty  0.523 0.214 0.263  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.110 0.412 0.478  1.000
No children in 
household 
  Non-Poor  0.024 0.162 0.814  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.404 0.460 0.135  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.142 0.470 0.388  1.000
1 or 2 children in 
household 
Non-Poor  0.010 0.090 0.900  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.522 0.352 0.126  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.163 0.486 0.351  1.000
3 or 4 children in 
household 
Non-Poor  0.013 0.196 0.791  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.490 0.429 0.081  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.177 0.507 0.316  1.000
5 children or 
more in 
household  Non-Poor  0.035 0.333 0.632  1.000
Note: Author’s estimation based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from EMNV 1998 and 2001 
using the expansion factor PESO2. Not adjusted. 
 
Because of the week evidence of relationships between number of children in household 
and poverty and social mobility, we choose to limit the number of categories to two: three 
children or less, and four children or more. The results are given in Tables A8 and A9. 
 
Table A8: Poverty at the individual level, by number of children in household, 2001  
  Number of children younger than 15 years of 
age in household in 2001 
Poverty classi-
fication in 2001 
3 or less 4 or more Total 
Extreme Poverty  0.077 0.301 0.150 
Moderate Poverty  0.250 0.426 0.308 
Non-Poor  0.673 0.273 0.542 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Note: Based on the 22810 individuals of the EMNV 2001 using the expansion factor PESO2.  
 
Table A9:  Markov Transition Matrices, by number of children in household, 1998-2001  












Extreme Poverty  0.490 0.362 0.148  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.144 0.459 0.397  1.000
3 children or less 
in household 
  Non-Poor  0.013 0.120 0.868  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.493 0.419 0.089  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.175 0.513 0.312  1.000
4 children or 
more in 
household  Non-Poor  0.024 0.298 0.678  1.000
Note: Author’s estimation based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from EMNV 1998 and 2001 
using the expansion factor PESO2. Not adjusted. 
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7.3. Number of adults in household 
 
Table A10 shows the counterintuitive result that the more adults there are in the 
household the higher the level of poverty. This, however, can probably also be explained 
by the failure to use equivalence scales in the calculation of poverty lines. 
 
Table A10: Poverty at the individual level, by number of adults in household, 2001  
  Number of adults (18 years or older) in household in 
2001 
Poverty classi-
fication in 2001 
0 or 1 2 3 or more Total 
Extreme Poverty  0.080 0.124 0.164 0.150 
Moderate Poverty  0.220 0.297 0.316 0.308 
Non-Poor  0.701 0.579 0.520 0.542 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Note: Based on the 22810 individuals of the EMNV 2001 using the expansion factor PESO2.  
 
Table A11 shows that there is no clear relationship between social mobility and number 
of adults in the household. This variable is consequently not taken into account in our 
main analysis. 
 
Table A11:  Markov Transition Matrices, by number of adults in household, 1998-2001  












Extreme Poverty  0.465 0.418 0.117  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.131 0.742 0.127  1.000
0 or 1 adult in 
household 
  Non-Poor  0.025 0.201 0.774  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.482 0.404 0.114  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.172 0.512 0.315  1.000
2 adults in 
household 
Non-Poor  0.017 0.165 0.818  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.496 0.403 0.101  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.154 0.469 0.377  1.000
3 or more adults 
in household 
Non-Poor  0.014 0.145 0.842  1.000
Note: Author’s estimation based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from EMNV 1998 and 2001 
using the expansion factor PESO2. Not adjusted. 
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7.4. Gender 
 
Tables A12 and A13 shows that women are not more poor and not more vulnerable than 
men in Nicaragua. If anything, they are slightly less poor and slightly less vulnerable than 
men, but the differences are small and therefore we do not need to make separate 
assumptions for men and women in our main analysis.  
 
 
Table A12: Poverty at the individual level, by sex, 2001  
  Sex 
Poverty classi-
fication in 2001 
Male Female Total 
Extreme Poverty  0.157 0.145 0.150 
Moderate Poverty  0.315 0.301 0.308 
Non-Poor  0.528 0.555 0.542 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Note: Based on the 22810 individuals of the EMNV 2001 using the expansion factor PESO2.  
 
 
Table A13:  Markov Transition Matrices, by sex, 1998-2001  
    Poverty classification in 2001 
Sex Poverty  classifica-








Extreme Poverty  0.493 0.410 0.097  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.160 0.488 0.353  1.000
Male 
 
Non-Poor  0.019 0.160 0.821  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.491 0.397 0.113  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.149 0.483 0.358  1.000
Female 
Non-Poor  0.012 0.147 0.574  1.000
Note: Author’s estimation based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from EMNV 1998 and 2001 
using the expansion factor PESO2. Not adjusted. 
 
Tables A14 and A15 shows that individuals living in female headed households are 
significantly less poor and less vulnerable than individuals living in male headed 
households. However, given the tendency to choose the husband as default head of 
household if he exists and is reasonable capable, this classification contains an inherent 
bias, and it is therefore not advisable to take the gender of the head of household into 
account in our main analysis.  
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Table A14: Poverty at the individual level, by sex of the head of household, 2001  
  Sex of the head of household 
Poverty classi-
fication in 2001 
Male Female Total 
Extreme Poverty  0.164 0.115 0.150 
Moderate Poverty  0.315 0.289 0.308 
Non-Poor  0.522 0.596 0.542 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Note: Based on the 22810 individuals of the EMNV 2001 using the expansion factor PESO2.  
 
                       
Table A15:  Markov Transition Matrices, by sex of the head of household, 1998-2001  
    Poverty classification in 2001 
Sex of the head 
of household 
Poverty classifica-








Extreme Poverty  0.507 0.401 0.092  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.170 0.473 0.357  1.000
Male 
 
Non-Poor  0.016 0.163 0.821  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.443 0.410 0.147  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.124 0.528 0.349  1.000
Female 
Non-Poor  0.012 0.128 0.860  1.000
Note: Author’s estimation based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from EMNV 1998 and 2001 
using the expansion factor PESO2. Not adjusted. 
 
 
7.5. Education level in the household 
 
Since our sample includes a large number of children who are still under education or has 
not even initiated schooling yet, we cannot use the education levels of each individual as 
a variable in our analysis. Instead we use the maximum level of education found in the 
household, which is a good indicator for the future level of education of the children. 
 
Tables A16 and A17 show that the education level in the household is extremely 
important both for the level of poverty and for the degree of social mobility. Secondary 
education is a rather good insurance against extreme poverty: Only 1.5% of the 
individuals living in households where at least one member has achieved 4 years of 
secondary education are extremely poor, while this is the case for 22.3% of the 
individuals living in households where nobody has reached 4 years of secondary 
education. 
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Table A16: Poverty at the individual level, by education level in the household, 2001  
  Highest education level in the household 
Poverty classi-
fication in 2001 
Less than 4 
years of 
secondary




Extreme Poverty  0.223 0.015 0.150 
Moderate Poverty  0.385 0.165 0.308 
Non-Poor  0.392 0.820 0.542 
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Note: Based on the 22810 individuals of the EMNV 2001 using the expansion factor PESO2.  
 
Table A17 shows that education is also excellent as a means of reducing vulnerability and 
increasing upward mobility. The downward mobility index is 0.183+0.030+0.239=0.452 
for individuals living in households with low levels of education whereas it is only 
0.042+0.000+0.065=0.107 for individuals living in households with high levels of 
education. Similarly, the upward mobility index is only 0.391+0.092+0.322=0.805 for 
individuals from low education households whereas it is 0.628+0.343+0.522=1.493 for 
individuals from high education households. 
 
Table A17:  Markov Transition Matrices, by sex of the head of household, 1998-2001  
    Poverty classification in 2001 
Highest 
education level in 
the household in 
1998 
Poverty classifica-








Extreme Poverty  0.518 0.391 0.092  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.183 0.495 0.322  1.000
Less than 4 
years of 
secondary  Non-Poor  0.030 0.239 0.731  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.029 0.628 0.343  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.042 0.436 0.522  1.000
4 years of 
secondary or 
more  Non-Poor  0.000 0.065 0.935  1.000
Note: Author’s estimation based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from EMNV 1998 and 2001 





Table A18 shows that poverty decreases systematically with age. Individuals under 20 
years of age are much more likely to be poor than grown ups. Elderly people are the least 
likely to be poor.  
 
However, some of the excessive poverty amongst children and young people may again 
be due to the failure to use equivalence scales in the calculation of poverty lines. All the 
children living in large households are not as poor as they appear when using the simple 
poverty lines, and this means that children on average are not as poor as it appears in 
Table A18. 
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Table A18: Poverty at the individual level, by age, 2001  
  Age (years) 
Poverty classi-
fication in 2001 
0-9 10-19 20-39 40-59 60+ Total
Extreme Poverty  0.196 0.171 0.117 0.113 0.108  0.150
Moderate Poverty  0.364 0.313 0.287 0.258 0.252  0.308
Non-Poor  0.440 0.516 0.596 0.629 0.640  0.542
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000
Note: Based on the 22810 individuals of the EMNV 2001 using the expansion factor PESO2.  
 
Table A17 shows that there is not a strong relationship between age and social mobility. 
 
Table A19:  Markov Transition Matrices, by age, 1998-2001  
    Poverty classification in 2001 
Age (in 1998)  Poverty classifica-








Extreme Poverty  0.507 0.401 0.093  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.175 0.502 0.323  1.000
0-9 
 
Non-Poor  0.016 0.187 0.798  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.491 0.400 0.110  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.165 0.479 0.356  1.000
10-19 
Non-Poor  0.015 0.158 0.827  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.468 0.433 0.099  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.154 0.495 0.351  1.000
20-39 
Non-Poor  0.013 0.137 0.850  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.489 0.405 0.106  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.137 0.439 0.424  1.000
40-59 
Non-Poor  0.012 0.149 0.839  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.480 0.326 0.194  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.114 0.480 0.407  1.000
60+ 
Non-Poor  0.025 0.105 0.871  1.000
Note: Author’s estimation based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from EMNV 1998 and 2001 
using the expansion factor PESO2. Not adjusted. 
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APPENDIX B: BI-PROPORTIONAL ADJUSTMENT OF SOCIAL 
MOBILITY MATRICES. 
 
Table B1a: Non-adjusted Markov Transition Matrix for individuals in Nicaragua, 1998-
2001  
  Poverty classification in 2001 
Poverty classifica-






Extreme Poverty  0.492 0.403 0.105 1.000 
Moderate Poverty  0.159 0.485 0.356 1.000 
Non-Poor  0.015 0.153 0.832 1.000 
Note: Author’s estimations based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from EMNV 1998 and 2001 
using the expansion factor PESO2. Non-adjusted. 
 
Table B1b: Adjusted Markov Transition Matrix for individuals in Nicaragua, 1998-2001  
  Poverty classification in 2001 
Poverty classifica-






Extreme Poverty  0.512 0.397 0.091 1.000 
Moderate Poverty  0.173 0.500 0.327 1.000 
Non-Poor  0.018 0.167 0.815 1.000 
Note: Author’s estimations based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from EMNV 1998  
and 2001 using the expansion factor PESO2. Has undergone a bi-proportional adjustment procedure to 
make the sample marginal poverty distributions coincide with the actual distributions for the whole 
population. 
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Table B2a: Unadjusted Markov Transition Matrices for individuals from different 
household types, 1998-2001  












Extreme Poverty  0.389 0.424 0.187  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.103 0.475 0.422  1.000
Urban 
Little education 
Few children  Non-Poor  0.011 0.145 0.844  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.537 0.355 0.108  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.174 0.548 0.278  1.000
Urban 
Little education 
Many children  Non-Poor  0.018 0.362 0.620  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.000 0.109 0.891  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.000 0.357 0.643  1.000
Urban 
More education 
Few children  Non-Poor  0.000 0.035 0.965  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.073 0.833 0.094  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.043 0.557 0.400  1.000
Urban 
More education 
Many children  Non-Poor  0.000 0.177 0.823  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.542 0.359 0.099  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.205 0.464 0.331  1.000
Rural 
Little education 
Few children  Non-Poor  0.047 0.263 0.700  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.515 0.409 0.076  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.204 0.503 0.293  1.000
Rural 
Little education 
Many children  Non-Poor  0.069 0.442 0.489  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.000 0.309 0.691  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.047 0.501 0.452  1.000
Rural 
More education 
Few children  Non-Poor  0.000 0.121 0.879  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.000 0.697 0.303  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.104 0.340 0.556  1.000
Rural 
More education 
Many children  Non-Poor  0.000 0.047 0.953  1.000
Nota: Author’s estimations based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from  EMNV 1998 and 2001 
using the expansion factor PESO2. Have not yet undergone the bi-proportional adjustment procedure.  
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Table B2b: Adjusted Markov Transition Matrices for individuals from different 
household types, 1998-2001  












Extreme Poverty  0.359 0.466 0.175  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.094 0.516 0.390  1.000
Urban 
Little education 
Few children  Non-Poor  0.011 0.167 0.822  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.571 0.332 0.097  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.192 0.549 0.259  1.000
Urban 
Little education 
Many children  Non-Poor  0.021 0.384 0.596  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.021 0.187 0.792  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.008 0.513 0.480  1.000
Urban 
More education 
Few children  Non-Poor  0.002 0.065 0.932  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.189 0.757 0.054  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.133 0.594 0.273  1.000
Urban 
More education 
Many children  Non-Poor  0.010 0.249 0.741  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.529 0.399 0.072  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.205 0.532 0.263  1.000
Rural 
Little education 
Few children  Non-Poor  0.052 0.332 0.616  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.628 0.332 0.039  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.307 0.503 0.190  1.000
Rural 
Little education 
Many children  Non-Poor  0.124 0.510 0.366  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.001 0.287 0.712  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.070 0.466 0.464  1.000
Rural 
More education 
Few children  Non-Poor  0.000 0.107 0.893  1.000
Extreme Poverty  0.008 0.869 0.123  1.000
Moderate Poverty  0.202 0.524 0.274  1.000
Rural 
More education 
Many children  Non-Poor  0.000 0.144 0.856  1.000
Nota: Author’s estimations based on 13491 matched non-migrant individuals from  EMNV 1998 and 2001 
using the expansion factor PESO2. Have undergone bi-proportional adjustment procedures to make the 
sample marginal poverty distributions coincide with the actual marginal distributions for the respective sub-
populations. 
 